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Comment 
Giving Lawrence Its Due: How the Eleventh 
Circuit Underestimated the Due Process 
Implications of Lawrence v. Texas in Lofton v. 
Secretary of the Department of Children & Family 
Services 
Megan Backer∗ 
In many respects, John Doe is a very lucky thirteen-year-
old boy, though his life did not begin that way. He was born an 
orphan, HIV-positive, and addicted to cocaine. Johns life 
changed immediately when Steven Lofton, a pediatric nurse, 
brought him home to join Loftons family. Today, John is 
happy, healthy, and thriving in his foster home. He has two fos-
ter parents who unconditionally love and guide him and four 
siblings, two of whom have been in his family since the day he 
was born. But John has no assurance that the State will allow 
him to remain with the only family he has ever known. Al-
though John calls his foster father Dad, that will never be 
Steven Loftons legal title. Johns foster father is gay, and their 
relationship is governed by the only state where being gay 
stands as an absolute bar to adoption: Florida. 
John and his father brought suit in federal court against 
Floridas Department of Children and Family Services to chal-
lenge Florida Statute section 63.042(3),1 the state law that pro-
hibits gays from adopting, on equal protection and due process 
grounds.2 The district court granted summary judgment for the 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003, 
Gustavus Adolphus College. The author thanks Professor Dale Carpenter for 
laying a sound due process foundation and providing helpful insight; Elizabeth 
Crouse, Shaw Scott, Monica MacMillan, and the board and staff of the Minne-
sota Law Review for their assistance; my family for years of encouragement; 
and Dylan Blumentritt for his unending support and patience. 
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005). 
 2. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff d 
sub nom. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 
804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
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Department of Children & Family Services, upholding section 
63.042(3).3 Doe and Lofton appealed. The Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,4 but it did so only after misin-
terpreting relevant precedent, most notably the Supreme 
Courts recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas.5 
This Comment will focus on the Lofton plaintiffs argument 
that a law categorically denying them the right to adopt chil-
dren because they are gay violates their substantive due proc-
ess right to form intimate relationships as recognized in Law-
rence.6 The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied the American 
Civil Liberties Unions (ACLU) petition to consider the Lofton 
case.7 Thus, it is imperative that future courts recognize the er-
rors of the Eleventh Circuit in Lofton. The Eleventh Circuit 
underestimated the import of Lawrence when it decided Lofton, 
and future courts should decline to follow the reasoning of the 
Lofton decision. 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the Supreme Courts 
due process jurisprudence as it existed when the Eleventh Cir-
cuit handed down Lofton. This jurisprudence includes the 
Courts landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas. Part II dis-
cusses Florida Statute section 63.042(3) and the Lofton case in 
depth. Part III argues that the Lofton court erred in holding 
that Lawrence did not involve a fundamental right and uphold-
ing section 63.042(3). It describes the analysis that the Elev-
enth Circuit should have undertaken and concludes that sec-
tion 63.042(3) impermissibly burdens a fundamental right of 
the gay plaintiffs in Lofton. 
 
 3. Id. at 1385. 
 4. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 806. 
 5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 6. This Comment will not fully address the courts error with respect to 
the Lofton plaintiffs equal protection arguments, though several critics have 
set forth strong arguments to that end. See Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Chil-
dren & Family Servs, 377 F.3d 1275, 12911303 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the rational basis test established in Romer v. Ev-
ans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432 (1985), U.S. Dept of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), requires invalidation of § 63.042(3)); Christo-
pher D. Jozwiak, Comment, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children 
& Family Services: Floridas Gay Adoption Ban Under Irrational Equal Pro-
tection Analysis, 23 LAW & INEQ. 407, 41827 (2005); Ann M. Reding, Note, 
Lofton v. Kearney: Equal Protection Mandates Equal Adoption Rights, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 130012 (2003). 
 7. Lofton v. Secy, Fla. Dept of Children & Families, 125 S. Ct. 869 
(2005), denying cert. to Lofton, 358 F.3d 804. 
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I.  THE STATE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
LEADING UP TO LOFTON: PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS FROM STATE INTRUSION 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution protects most individual rights guaranteed by 
the Bill of Rights, plus those rights deemed fundamental, 
from undue state interference.8 Laws that burden fundamental 
rights are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny; to be upheld, 
they must be narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state 
interest.9 Laws that do not burden a fundamental right must 
only be rationally related to achieving a legitimate state inter-
est for the courts to deem them constitutional.10 This standard 
of review is quite deferential to lawmakers.11 Contemporary 
substantive due process jurisprudence has asked: Which rights 
are fundamental? 
A. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE THOSE DEEPLY ROOTED IN 
HISTORY AND TRADITION 
For the past forty years, the Supreme Court has been form-
ing and reforming its substantive due process jurisprudence in 
a number of cases that have considered the fundamental na-
ture of a variety of deeply personal issues.12 Fundamental 
rights have been described as those implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty13 or those deeply rooted in this Nations his-
tory and tradition.14 While the Court has generally retained 
the history and traditions inquiry when determining the exis-
 
 8. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 14749 (1968). 
 9. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
427 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Lofton, 358 
F.3d at 815. 
 10. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997); Reno v. Flo-
res, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993). 
 11. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. 
 12. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?: Of Autonomy, Des-
uetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 3739 (summarizing 
the Supreme Courts substantive due process jurisprudence prior to Law-
rence). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 638710 (1997) (discussing the Courts substantive due process 
cases and their public policy implications). 
 13. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). 
 14. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
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tence of a fundamental right, the analysis has proven malle-
able. The Court has, however, developed a pattern of protecting 
decisions it considers private or central to personal dignity and 
autonomy.15 
The Supreme Court has invoked substantive due process to 
protect a number of rights central to the family, such as the 
right to marry, from state intervention.16 The Court has also 
recognized that parents have a fundamental right to make de-
cisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their chil-
drenone of the oldest fundamental rights recognized by the 
Court.17 
The Court has also applied substantive due process protec-
tion to personal matters traditionally respected less than mar-
riage and child rearing. In the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe line of 
cases, the Supreme Court crafted a fundamental right to pri-
vacy that protected from state intervention a married couples 
right to contraception,18 the right of an unmarried couple to the 
same,19 and a womans right to terminate her pregnancy before 
viability,20 respectively. Griswold v. Connecticut, in striking 
down a state law prohibiting the use of contraception, infa-
mously located the fundamental right to privacy in penum-
bras, formed by emanations from several specific guarantees 
found in the Bill of Rights.21 Eisenstadt v. Baird applied Gris-
 
 15. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 16. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 38687 (1978). In Zablocki, the 
Court struck down a state law requiring noncustodial parents to obtain court 
approval in order to marry, which would only be given if the applicants had 
fulfilled obligations to pay child support. Id. at 38791. The Court held that 
the right to marry was fundamental and could not be interfered with so di-
rectly and substantially, despite the States interest in providing for its chil-
dren. Id. at 38687; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking 
down state miscegenation laws on both equal protection and due process 
grounds). 
 17. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 6568 (2000) (reversing a state court 
decision granting visitation rights to childrens grandparents over the objec-
tion of their mother because it violated the mothers due process right to over-
see her children); see also Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534535 
(1925) (holding that parents and guardians have a right to direct the upbring-
ing and education of children under their control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects the 
right of parents to establish a home and bring up children and to control the 
education of their own). 
 18. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 48586. 
 19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 45455 (1972). 
 20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 21. 381 U.S. at 484. Griswold also placed an emphasis on marriage in 
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wold to unmarried individuals and struck down a state law 
that allowed the distribution of contraceptives to prevent preg-
nancy only to married individuals.22 Though it based its deci-
sion on the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated, If the 
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.23 
The landmark Roe v. Wade decision went a step beyond 
protecting a persons decision to use contraception.24 The Court 
faced a challenge to a Texas abortion law that prohibited abor-
tion at any stage of pregnancy unless it was medically neces-
sary to save the life of the mother.25 The plaintiff was an un-
married woman who wanted to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy.26 She was unable to do so legally in Texas and could 
not afford to travel to a jurisdiction that permitted abortions.27 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, observed that while 
no right to privacy is explicit in the Constitution, the Courts 
past decisions found such a right implicit in several constitu-
tional provisions, including the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.28 He further noted that whatever the 
source of the right to privacy, it is broad enough to encompass 
a womans decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy.29 The right, however, is not unqualified. The Court de-
termined that at the end of the first trimester, the States in-
terest in protecting the mothers health becomes compelling 
and overrides her right to privacy, and at the point of the fe-
tuss viability, the States interest in protecting life becomes 
compelling and overrides the mothers right to privacy.30 
Roe has withstood significant criticism. Twenty years after 
Roe, the Court decided Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
 
striking down a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Id. at 
485 (suggesting that it would be impermissible to allow police to search the 
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contracep-
tives). 
 22. 405 U.S. at 45455. 
 23. Id. at 453. 
 24. 410 U.S. 113. 
 25. Id. at 11718. 
 26. Id. at 124. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 15253. 
 29. Id. at 153. 
 30. Id. at 16364. 
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Pennsylvania v. Casey.31 Casey transformed Roes right to pri-
vacy into, simply, liberty,32 which, unlike a right to privacy, 
is expressly located in the Due Process Clause.33 Casey made no 
mention of a fundamental right, though it recognized the cen-
trality of personal decisions to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34 The decision then upheld Roe and 
struck down a state abortion law.35 The Court in Casey also in-
dicated that public opinion about the supposed immorality of 
an activity would not enter its due process analysis, stating, 
Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our 
own moral code.36 Casey reiterated the Griswold-Eisenstadt-
Roe principle that the Due Process Clause protects the right of 
individuals to make personal decisions concerning certain pri-
vate matters without government intrusion.37 
In Washington v. Glucksberg,38 the Court returned to a 
more traditional fundamental rights analysis after an arguable 
departure in Casey.39 Glucksberg considered whether a state 
law banning assisted suicide violated the due process rights of 
terminally ill patients to end their lives.40 In its opinion, the  
 
 
 31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 32. Id. at 84648. Some commentators cheer this break from traditional 
fundamental rights analysis. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 
1931 (2004) (arguing that reducing substantive due process claims to ones 
ability to narrowly categorize the right at issue in a misguided hunt for a tra-
dition of social and legal protection sufficiently specific and enduring to war-
rant awarding those acts a special seal of constitutional approval is flawed); 
see also Nan D. Hunter, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1117 
(2004). But see Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1140, 1151 (2004) (observing that Caseys break from the traditional analysis 
was temporary, as the Court returned to a more traditional analysis in Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg). 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. One criticism of the right to privacy 
cases has been that the right is not actually located in the Constitution. See 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 97, 11326 (1990); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A 
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 92737 (1973) (arguing that Roe 
v. Wade lacks constitutional support). This may have been one reason for the 
Courts shift to a right to liberty in Casey. 
 34. 505 U.S. at 851. 
 35. See id. at 879901. 
 36. Id. at 850. 
 37. Id. at 851. 
 38. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 39. See Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1151. 
 40. 521 U.S. at 708. 
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Court propagated a two-featured model of substantive due 
process analysis.41 First, the Due Process Clause protects fun-
damental rights that are deeply rooted in this Nations history 
and tradition.42 Second, a careful description of the right is 
required to determine whether it is, in fact, fundamental.43 The 
Court concluded that there has been no history and tradition 
of protecting the right to commit suicide, as it carefully de-
scribed the right at issue.44 It went on to apply rational basis 
review to the law and ultimately upheld it.45 
B. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO 
LIBERTY ENCOMPASSING PRIVATE SEXUAL INTIMACY 
The Supreme Courts substantive due process jurispru-
dence has specifically examined the privacy rights of gay indi-
viduals in two principal cases. First, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
the Supreme Court considered a due process challenge to a 
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy.46 According to the Court, 
the asserted liberty interest was a fundamental right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy.47 The Court not only found no 
history and tradition of protecting such a right, it found a 
contrary tradition of criminalizing homosexual sodomy.48 The 
Court upheld the law under rational basis review, holding that  
 
 
 41. Id. at 72021. 
 42. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 43. Id. at 721. 
 44. Id. at 723. Compare id. (concluding that the asserted liberty interest 
in suicide did not find refuge in substantive due process precedent), with Cru-
zan v. Dir., Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 27879 (1990) (holding that the 
Due Process Clause protects the right of a competent person to refuse lifesav-
ing hydration and nutrition). 
 45. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
 46. 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578 (2003). 
 47. Id. at 191. 
 48. Id. at 19194 (noting that twenty-four States and the District of Co-
lumbia criminalized sodomy at the time). The Court also quickly dispensed 
with any similarities between the right at issue in and the rights protected in 
its prior substantive due process cases. Id. at 19091. For a response to the 
Courts reasoning on this point, see Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Lib-
eral Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 53337 
(1989), reprinted in part in WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND THE LAW 266, 26668 (2d ed. 1997), arguing that homosexual relation-
ships are identical to heterosexual relationships in that they both reflect the 
choices of autonomous selves and are valuable for both the individuals in-
volved and society, id. at 534. 
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the right at issue was not fundamental and that the State had 
a legitimate interest in promoting morality.49 
Bowers controlled for nearly seventeen years until the 
court overruled it in Lawrence v. Texas.50 Lawrence involved a 
constitutional challenge to a Texas law prohibiting same-sex 
sodomy.51 The plaintiffs were engaged in a sexual act in John 
Lawrences apartment when the police entered the apartment 
and observed them.52 The police arrested the two men, took 
them into custody, held them overnight, and charged them with 
sodomy.53 After a justice of the peace convicted them, they ex-
ercised their right to trial in Harris County Criminal Court; 
however, the court rejected their constitutional challenges to 
the Texas law.54 The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, relying 
on Bowers to answer the substantive due process questions.55 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and proceeded to 
extend to gay individuals the right to privacy in intimate rela-
tionships already implicitly available to heterosexuals.56 
The Lawrence Court began by summarizing the Supreme 
Courts earlier due process right to privacy cases, beginning 
with Griswold.57 When it came to Bowers, the Court engaged in 
a detailed review and harsh criticism.58 First, Bowers had mis-
characterized the right at issue: To say that the issue in Bow-
ers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct 
 
 49. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. Bowers was a 5-4 decision. Justice Powell 
who, after much persuasion, provided the swing vote to create a majority
later reflected that Bowers was the one error he believed he had made while 
on the Court. Tribe, supra note 32, at 195354; accord JOHN C. JEFFRIES, 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 51830 (1994) (describing exchanges between 
the Justices throughout the course of rendering the Bowers decision and con-
versations between Justice Powell and his law clerks illustrating his difficulty 
with the case). 
 50. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 51. Id. at 562. 
 52. Id. at 56263. 
 53. Id. at 563. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 574; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 849 (1992). 
 57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 56466. The Court discussed Griswold, Eisen-
stadt, Roe, and Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 
(1977), to paint a picture of the state of the law with respect to some of the 
most relevant cases when the Court considered [Bowers]. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 566. 
 58. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 56678. 
BACKER_3FMT 01/23/2006 05:03:31 PM 
2006] GIVING LAWRENCE ITS DUE 753 
 
demeans the claim the individual put forward . . . .59 The Law-
rence Court instead referred simply to a right to liberty60 
reminiscent of the Courts language in Casey. Second, the Law-
rence Court noted that the Bowers Court erred in its treatment 
of history when it concluded that laws against homosexual sod-
omy had ancient roots, and thus there could be no fundamen-
tal right to engage in the practice sufficiently rooted in history 
and tradition.61 In fact, according to Lawrence, early laws pro-
hibiting sodomy were not targeted at same-sex behavior.62 In-
stead, they prohibited the act of sodomy in general.63 Same-sex 
sodomy was not singled out legally until the 1970s, so the an-
cient roots relied upon in Bowers were false.64 Besides, the 
Court noted, many of the sodomy laws once in effect had been 
repealed or had ceased to be enforced, and an emerging aware-
ness recognized that liberty includes private sexual intimacy.65 
Not only history, but also this emerging awareness, both in the 
U.S. and abroad, dictated that Bowers was incorrect.66 
Finally, the Court examined two subsequent cases that had 
weakened Bowerss precedential value even further.67 In Casey, 
the Court affirmed that the Constitution protects personal de-
cisions regarding intimate relationships.68 And in Romer v. Ev-
ans,69 the Court struck down Colorados Amendment 2, an 
amendment to repeal local ordinances that prohibited discrimi-
nation on the basis of homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orienta-
tion, conduct, practices, or relationships,70 because a law born 
of animosity toward [a] class of persons affected would not 
even survive rational basis review.71 The Lawrence Court an-
 
 59. Id. at 567. 
 60. Id. at 564. 
 61. Id. at 56773. 
 62. Id. at 56971. 
 63. See id.  
 64. Id. at 570. 
 65. Id. at 572. 
 66. Id. at 57273. The Court noted that many U.S. States, as well as both 
the British Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights, had de-
criminalized homosexual sodomy. Id. 
 67. Id. at 57375.  
 68. Id. at 57374 (discussing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
 69. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 70. Id. at 624. 
 71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 57475 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). Ro-
mer was a decisive victory for gays in their quest for legal rights. Though Ro-
mer did not expressly determine whether gays were a suspect class for equal 
protection purposes (a label that would have required application of height-
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nounced, Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is 
not correct today . . . . Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled.72 The Court proceeded to strike down the Texas 
sodomy law as a violation of substantive due process.73 
Significantly, the Court expressly declined to strike down 
the law on equal protection grounds,74 rejecting the proposal 
Justice OConnor advocated in her concurring opinion.75 The 
majority may have feared that, were it to do so, a differently-
drawn prohibition on sodomyone that criminalized the act 
between heterosexual as well as homosexual partnerswould 
stand after Lawrence.76 Such a prohibition would be a mere 
loophole, as it would undoubtedly be enforced against gays 
more often than it would be enforced against heterosexuals en-
gaged in sodomy.77 The Court noted, When homosexual con-
duct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration 
 
ened scrutiny to any law that classified people based on sexual orientation), it 
held that Amendment 2 could not withstand even rational basis review. See 
Romer, 517 U.S. at 63132. The law was at once too narrow and too broad 
and thus not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. Id. at 633. The 
Court also inferred from this incongruity that the amendment had been moti-
vated by animosity toward gays and lesbians, thus violating the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Id. at 63435. The Court stated, [I]f the constitutional concep-
tion of equal protection of the laws means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot con-
stitute a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 634 (alteration in original) 
(quoting U.S. Dept of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 72. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; cf. Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1149 
(Page after page of the majority decision is devoted to a harsh critique of 
[Bowers] for being wrong about history, wrong about doctrine, wrong about 
precedent, and wrong about facts. It is an extended and heartfelt apology to 
gays for the harm done.). 
 73. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 57879. 
 74. Id. at 57475. 
 75. Justice OConnor, detecting the animus that inspired Texass sodomy 
law and acknowledging the personal relationships involved, applied a more 
searching rational basis review in her equal protection analysis. Id. at 57981 
(OConnor, J., concurring). Since moral disapproval was an illegitimate state 
interest under Romer, Justice OConnor argued, the Texas law could be struck 
down on narrower and more manageable equal protection grounds. See id. at 
58384.  
 76. See id. at 575 (majority opinion). 
 77. See id. at 573 (noting that of the thirteen States with sodomy laws at 
the time Lawrence was decided, four enforced their laws exclusively against 
gays); cf. Hunter, supra note 32, at 1133 (noting the indirect enforcement of 
sodomy laws in the denial of custody or other parental rights to gay parents 
or by exclusions from certain jobs based on the logical connection between 
homosexuality and violation of a sodomy law, even though the litigants had 
never been convicted of illegal conduct).  
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in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.78 
Explicitly overruling Bowers was a necessary step in deterring 
such discrimination. Referencing Justice Stevenss dissent in 
Bowers, the Court also directed that morality alone should no 
longer be considered a rational basis for upholding a law.79 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his scathing dissent,80 
Lawrence lacks traditional due process language: description of 
the right at issue, characterization of the right as fundamen-
tal, and application of one doctrinal test or another.81 Much 
debate has focused on the nature of the right that Lawrence 
recognized and whether Lawrence deemed that right funda-
mental. Some critics focus their analysis on a single statement 
near the end of the majority opinion: The Texas statute fur-
thers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion 
into the personal and private life of the individual.82 They in-
sist that the Court applied rational basis review to a law that 
burdened no fundamental right,83 and assert that the words 
legitimate state interest provide evidence of such a stan-
dard,84 though the majority never used the words rational ba-
sis or rationally related. 
Others argue that the Court adhered to precedent, treating 
Lawrence as a fundamental right to privacy case.85 According 
 
 78. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575; see also Danaya C. Wright, The Logic and 
Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and the Politics of Privacy, 15 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POLY 403, 40405 (2004). 
 79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 57778 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); cf. id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(lamenting that the majoritys holding decrees the end of all morals legisla-
tion). 
 80. Id. at 586605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 81. See id. at 586, 594. 
 82. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
 83. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lofton v. Secy of the 
Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). But see Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1151 (argu-
ing that this statement by the Court is best understood as a comment only on 
the comparative weakness of the morality claim against the strong interests of 
[the plaintiffs] and does not constitute evidence sufficient to conclude that the 
Court was engaging in rational basis review). 
 84. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 
578 (majority opinion) and referring to the majoritys rational-basis holding); 
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, and concluding 
that the Lawrence Court invalidated the Texas law on rational basis grounds). 
 85. See generally Carpenter, supra note 32 (arguing that a broad libertar-
ian reading of Lawrence is incorrect and that the right at issue in Lawrence 
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to these scholars, the language used to overrule Bowers and de-
scribe a profound respect for the importance of relational pri-
vacy suggests that the Court was not addressing a right it con-
sidered less than fundamental. The Courts discussion of 
precedent also indicates that it was not subjecting the Texas 
law to rational basis review;86 most of the cases cited by the 
Court were fundamental right to privacy cases, with the excep-
tion of Romer, which was a recent and notable victory for gays 
decided on equal protection grounds.87 There is no reason why 
the Court would discuss fundamental rights cases, comparing 
Lawrence rather than distinguishing it, and treat gay relation-
ships with such apologetic reverence if it did not consider the 
right in Lawrence fundamental as well. 
Others read Lawrence as a right to liberty case,88 and the 
most extreme of them predict an upcoming libertarian revolu-
tion in the Courts due process jurisprudence.89 This reading 
argues that the Courts failure to announce a fundamental 
right, rather than triggering rational basis review, signaled a 
complete abandonment of the traditional tiers of fundamental 
rights analysis in favor of a presumption of liberty.90 Under 
this libertarian view, where any liberty interest is involved, the 
Court will force the government to justify its intrusion on that 
interest rather than place the burden on the individual to prove 
that the liberty interest is fundamental.91 Few governmental 
justifications will suffice, short of preventing individuals from 
 
was a fundamental right to privacy). For an argument that Lawrence recog-
nized a fundamental right to privacy but was primarily concerned with famil-
ial relations rather than sexual privacy, see David D. Meyer, Domesticating 
Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 46065, 48085 (2004). Cf. Carlos A. 
Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in 
the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1208 n.106 (2004) 
(noting that the Lawrence Courts use of precedent dictates that it should be 
read as a fundamental rights case). 
 86. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 3942, 4547; see also Ball, supra note 
85, at 1208 n.106. 
 87. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 56466. 
 88. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedys Libertarian Revolution: Law-
rence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 20022003, at 21, 21 (James 
L. Swanson ed., 2003); cf. Hunter, supra note 32, at 110417 (arguing that 
Lawrence replaces a right to privacy with a right to liberty and revises the 
traditional fundamental rights analysis, yet remains somewhat embedded in 
that framework). 
 89. See Barnett, supra note 88, at 21. 
 90. Id. at 3537. 
 91. See id. at 36; Hunter, supra note 32, at 111516. 
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infringing on others rights.92 
Whatever the nature of the right at issue, the Lawrence 
Court displayed a much more respectful, evolved perception of 
gay men and lesbians than the Bowers Court had. Where Bow-
ers focused on the act of sodomy, Lawrence focused on the per-
sonal relationship that precedes and permeates that act, ob-
serving that [w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but 
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.93 Law-
rence also engages in a detailed discussion of the emerging 
[national and international] awareness that liberty allows 
adults to make decisions about their private sexuality.94 As one 
scholar observed, Having gone out of its way to insult gay 
Americans in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court in Lawrence went 
out of its way to assist gays in the quest for full citizenship.95 
When the Supreme Court handed down Lawrence, Lofton 
v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services96 
was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. Lofton would be the first lower court case to apply Law-
rence to a substantive due process question and to attempt to 
extract workable precedent from Lawrences complex language. 
As the Lofton decision demonstrates, interpreting Lawrence is 
not a straightforward task, and courts have made and may con-
tinue to make mistakes in doing so. 
II.  LOFTON V. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES 
John Doe was born an HIV-positive cocaine baby on April 
29, 1991.97 Steven Lofton was a pediatric nurse with extensive 
experience caring for HIV-positive patients.98 He was also certi-
fied as a long-term foster parent.99 Shortly after Does birth, 
 
 92. See Barnett, supra note 88, at 37; Hunter, supra note 32, at 111516. 
 93. 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 94. Id. at 57173; see also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 3942, 5360 (argu-
ing that erosion of public support for antigay policy played a significant part in 
the outcome of Lawrence). 
 95. Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1148. 
 96. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
 97. Id. at 807. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff d 
sub nom. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 
804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
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Lofton took Doe into foster care with the blessing of the State of 
Florida.100 At the time Doe joined the family, Lofton and his 
partner, Roger Croteau, had been in a committed relationship 
for approximately eight years.101 They have cared for six foster 
children, all born HIV-positive, on a long-term basis.102 The 
children think of themselves as siblings, and they call Lofton 
Dad.103 Lofton and Croteau have been exemplary foster par-
ents. At the States insistence, Lofton stopped working as a pe-
diatric nurse to care for the children and their medical needs 
full-time.104 In 1998, the Childrens Home Society created an 
award for the outstanding foster parent of the year, which it 
named the Lofton-Croteau Award, and presented the first 
award to Lofton and Croteau.105 
At eighteen months, Doe seroreverted; he remains HIV-
negative.106 Does changed health status made him eligible for 
adoption in 1994, and Lofton applied to adopt him.107 The State 
of Florida denied the application because Lofton failed to check 
either the yes or the no box adjacent to the following state-
 
 100. ACLU Lesbian & Gay Rights Project, The Lofton-Croteau Family: The 
Kids, http://www.lethimstay.com/loftons_kids.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2005) 
[hereinafter Lofton-Croteau Family]. 
 101. Affidavit of Steven K. Lofton ¶¶ 2, 7, Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (No. 
99-10058-CIV-KING). 
 102. See Lofton-Croteau Family, supra note 100. Croteau and his partner 
had three foster childrenFrank, Tracy, and Gingerwhen John Doe was 
placed in their home. See id. Ginger had been quite sick from birth due to HIV 
and the addictive drugs in her body. See id. She died at age six from AIDS-
related complications, devastating the family. Id. The family moved to Oregon 
in the late 1990s. Id. A caseworker in Portland, after hearing from the familys 
pediatrician about Loftons and Croteaus parenting skills, approached them 
about taking two more HIV-positive foster children who had been difficult to 
place. Id. And so the family grew by two more, and Wayne and Ernie came 
home to live with the Lofton-Croteau family. Id. 
 103. Appellants Brief at 89, Lofton, 358 F.3d 804 (No. 01-16723-DD). 
 104. Id. at 7. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807. Seroreversion occurseither spontaneously 
or in response to therapywhen an individual ceases to test positive for the 
presence of HIV antibodies. On-Line Medical Dictionary, Dept of Med. Oncol-
ogy, Univ. of Newcastle upon Tyne, http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/omd/index.html 
(search for seroreversion and serology) (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).  
 107. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff d 
sub nom. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 
804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). Lofton had the sup-
port and encouragement of several state caseworkers and Does attorney ad 
litem in filing his adoption application. Appellants Brief, supra note 103, at 9.  
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ment on the adoption application form: I am a homosexual.108 
Though Lofton did not disclose his sexual orientation on the 
adoption form, Floridas Department of Children and Families 
(DCF) conceded that it denied Loftons application because he 
is gay.109 
That question is included on Floridas adoption application 
form because Florida Statute section 63.042(3) prohibits gay 
men and lesbians from adopting.110 It was enacted in 1977, 
months after Anita Bryanta singer, former Miss Oklahoma, 
and Florida Orange Juice spokeswomanlaunched an antigay 
campaign called Save Our Children.111 Bryants campaign 
combined newspaper advertisements with political speeches 
disguised as singing engagements in an effort to convince Flo-
ridians that gay people were dangerous to children and that 
Dade Countys recently passed gay rights law ought to be re-
pealed.112 The campaign paved the way for legislation like sec-
tion 63.042(3), which passed overwhelmingly in the Florida leg-
islature.113 After the law passed, its primary sponsor, Senator 
Curtis Peterson, stated: 
The problem in Florida has been that homosexuals are surfacing to 
such an extent that theyre beginning to aggravate the ordinary folk, 
who have a few rights of their own. Were trying to send them a mes-
sage, telling them: Were really tired of you. We wish youd go back 
into the closet.114 
 
 
 108. See Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 n.3. See generally FLORIDA DE-
PARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ADOPTIVE HOME APPLICATION CFOP 
175-54, http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/publications/eforms/fsp5071.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2006). 
 109. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 n.3. 
 110. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005). Mississippi and Utah have 
implemented similarly restrictive adoption statutes, though neither law ex-
plicitly prohibits all gay individuals from adopting, as does the Florida statute. 
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2004) (prohibiting [a]doption by couples of 
the same gender); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2002) (prohibiting adop-
tion by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid 
and binding marriage). 
 111. ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, TOO HIGH A PRICE: THE CASE 
AGAINST RESTRICTING GAY PARENTING 67 (2005). 
 112. Id. Dade Countys gay rights law was repealed days before the gover-
nor signed section 63.042(3) into law. See id. at 78. 
 113. Id. Only one Florida Senator, Donald Chamberlin, spoke out against 
[section 63.042(3)], saying that in adoption all other concerns should yield to 
the concern for the child. But the heart of this bill is not the subject matter of 
adoptionsit is discrimination. Id. at 7. 
 114. Id. at 8. 
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Section 63.042(3) states: No person eligible to adopt under 
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.115 Ho-
mosexuals have been defined, for purposes of the statute, as 
applicants who are known to engage in current, voluntary ho-
mosexual activity.116 Florida legislators have made several un-
successful attempts to repeal the statute.117 
Though the DCF had rejected Loftons adoption applica-
tion, the agency later offered to grant Lofton legal guardianship 
over Doe.118 Legal guardianship would have removed Doe from 
the foster care system and DCF supervision, but Lofton re-
jected the offer and continued to seek adoption of Doe.119 The 
guardianship arrangement would have cost Lofton over $300 a 
month in lost foster care subsidies and would have jeopardized 
Does Medicaid coverage without providing the benefits of 
adoption.120 Also, it was simply important to Doe to be adopted, 
and Lofton wanted Doe finally to enjoy the emotional security 
that accompanies adoption.121 Lofton and Doe filed suit in fed-
eral court against the Secretary and District Administrator of 
the DCF.122 They were joined by Douglas Houghton, a gay 
man;123 John Roe, a child under Houghtons legal guardian-
ship;124 and Wayne Larue Smith and Daniel Skahen, whose 
adoption application was denied because of their sexual orien-
tation.125 
 
 115. § 63.042(3). 
 116. Dept of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1214 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 117. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
807 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); see S. 752, 1995 
Reg. Sess. § 19 (Fla. 1995); H.R. 349, 1995 Reg. Sess. § 19 (Fla. 1995); H.R. 
1461, 1993 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1993). 
 118. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808; see also Letter from Andrea K. Owes, Family 
Servs. Counselor, Fla. Dept of Children & Family Servs., to Steven Lofton 
(June 20, 2000) (on file with author). 
 119. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Affidavit of Steven K. Lofton, supra note 101, ¶ 21. 
 122. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff d sub 
nom. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
 123. Id. at 137576. 
 124. Id. Roes alcoholic biological father left him in Houghtons care when 
Roe was four years old. Id. at 1375. Houghton became Roes legal guardian, 
and a few years later, when Roes father terminated his parental rights, 
Houghton attempted to adopt Roe. Id. at 137576. Houghton was unsuccessful 
because he is gay. Id. at 1376. 
 125. Id. at 1376. When Lofton and the other plaintiffs originally filed suit, 
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Lofton and his fellow plaintiffs alleged that section 
63.042(3) violated (1) their fundamental rights to familial pri-
vacy, intimate association and family integrity protected by the 
First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and (2) their 
rights to equal protection guaranteed by the 14th Amend-
ment.126 The federal district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the DCF on reasoning later adopted by the appellate 
court, as discussed below.127 
The plaintiffs appealed to a panel of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.128 In light of the Supreme Courts recent decision in Law-
rence v. Texas,129 the Lofton plaintiffs added a third argument 
on appeal: Lawrence recognized a fundamental right to private 
sexual intimacy and [section 63.042(3)], by disallowing adop-
tion by individuals who engage in homosexual activity, imper-
missibly burdens the exercise of this right.130 
Before reaching the arguments, the Eleventh Circuit noted 
in its decision that under Florida law, adoption is a privilege 
rather than a right, and a public act, not a private one.131 Be-
cause the best interests of the child override all other factors in 
an adoption proceeding, the State is allowed greater leeway to 
make classifications for adoption purposes than it would be al-
lowed in other areas of law.132 In fact, the court noted that no 
federal precedent existed in which an adoption scheme had 
 
they were joined by Brenda and Gregory Bradley and Angela Gilmore. Id. The 
Bradleys claimed that they intended to designate a homosexual relative to be 
the adoptive parent of their children in the event of their deaths. Id. Gilmore 
said she was a lesbian and desired to adopt, but she had not applied to adopt. 
See id. at 137677. The district court dismissed the claims of these plaintiffs 
for lack of standing. Id. at 1377. 
 126. Id. at 1377. The District Court for the Southern District of Florida is-
sued its opinion on August 30, 2001, id. at 1372, almost two years before the 
United States Supreme Court handed down Lawrence v. Texas. Therefore, nei-
ther the plaintiffs allegations nor the courts opinion took Lawrence into ac-
count. 
 127. Id. at 1385; see Recent Case, Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Statute 
Barring Gays from Adopting: Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Chil-
dren & Family Services, 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2791, 279394 (2004). 
 128. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
 129. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 130. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809. 
 131. Id. at 80911 (quoting Dept of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 
627 So. 2d 1210, 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 132. Id. at 810. 
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been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds by any 
individual other than a natural parent.133 
The court then turned to the plaintiffs first claim, that sec-
tion 63.042(3) violates their First Amendment and due process 
rights to familial privacy, intimate association, and family in-
tegrity.134 In responding to the claim, the court discussed only 
the plaintiffs claimed right to family integrity and held that 
they had none.135 While parents have a fundamental right to 
make decisions regarding their children, the court found no 
precedent for treating foster families or guardian-ward rela-
tionships like biological families.136 Though they share an emo-
tional bond, the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of 
permanency in their familial arrangements, which is required 
for a fundamental right to family integrity.137 The court de-
clined to recognize a new fundamental right to family integ-
rity for groups of individuals who have merely formed loving 
and interdependent relationships.138 
The courts equal protection analysis began by noting that 
since the Florida law burdened no fundamental rights and ho-
mosexuals have never been treated as a suspect class, rational 
basis review would apply.139 As a result, the court only had to 
conclude that the laws classification was rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.140 Florida asserted a state interest in 
advancing the best interests of children by placing them in 
homes with a married mother and father.141 The nuclear famil-
ial arrangement, the State argued, promoted heterosexual role 
 
 133. Id. at 811. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 815. 
 136. Id. at 81215. 
 137. Id. at 814. 
 138. Id. at 815. 
 139. Id. at 818. 
 140. Id.; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 141. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. In a footnote, the court mentioned that Flor-
ida also asserted an interest in promoting public morality. Id. at 819 n.17. The 
plaintiffs argued that morality could not be a legitimate state interest under 
Romer and Lawrence. See id.; Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 5, Lofton, 
358 F.3d 804 (No. 01-16723-DD). The court disagreed, finding support in two 
Supreme Court cases decided prior to both Romer and Lawrence. Lofton, 358 
F.3d at 819 n.17. The court stated that the furtherance of public morality 
could be a legitimate state interest. Id. However, the court concluded that it 
was unnecessary to resolve the question, as it had found that Floridas as-
serted interest in placing children in homes with married parents provided a 
rational basis for the law. Id. 
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modeling and appropriate shaping of gender identity, in addi-
tion to the general stability that a marriage offers.142 The court 
found that this asserted interest provided a rational basis for 
the law.143 
The Lofton plaintiffs argued that, while the State may 
have a legitimate interest in placing adoptive children with 
marital families, the means employedcategorically excluding 
gay men and lesbians from adoptingare not rationally related 
to those ends.144 The plaintiffs argued that section 63.042(3) 
could not withstand rational basis review under Romer v. Ev-
ans because of the loose connection between the laws means 
and its end. Coupled with history, this loose means-ends fit in-
dicated that the law was prompted by animus.145 The court 
noted that rational basis review does not require a perfect 
means-ends fit, and thus over- or under-inclusiveness does not 
render a statute unconstitutional.146 Accordingly, it held that 
the plaintiffs rights to equal protection had not been vio-
lated.147 
The Lofton plaintiffs third argument, that Lawrence had 
announced a fundamental right to private sexual intimacy and 
section 63.042(3) impermissibly burdened that right, was also 
not well received. The court concluded that Lawrence had not 
announced a fundamental right at all, so it need not look any 
 
 142. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 81819. 
 143. Id. at 819 n.17. The court stated: 
It is hard to conceive an interest more legitimate and more para-
mount for the state than promoting an optimal social structure for 
educating, socializing, and preparing its future citizens to become 
productive participants in civil societyparticularly when those fu-
ture citizens are displaced children for whom the state is standing in 
loco parentis. 
Id. at 819. 
 144. See id. at 820. 
 145. See id. at 82627. The court distinguished section 63.042(3) from the 
amendment at issue in Romer in that section 63.042(3) is restricted to only one 
area of law and has a rational relationship with the States asserted interest. 
Id. At least one scholar argues that section 63.042(3) is even more suspect un-
der Romer than the law at issue in Romer itself, as section 63.042(3) is more 
historically connected with class legislation than was the Colorado initia-
tive . . . , and Floridas antigay policies create a class of people denied family-
oriented protections even more basic than those denied by the Colorado initia-
tive. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF 
THE CLOSET 212 (1999). 
 146. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 82223. 
 147. Id. at 82627. 
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further at Lawrences implications for the Lofton plaintiffs.148 
The court noted that the Lawrence Court did not explicitly 
characterize the right in question in Lawrence as fundamen-
tal, citing Justice Scalias dissent, nor did the Lawrence Court 
specifically locate the right in a particular constitutional 
clause.149 The court went on to observe that the Lawrence Court 
broke from established fundamental rights analysis by failing 
to determine whether the right in question was deeply rooted 
in this Nations history and tradition and implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty,150 and failing to provide a careful de-
scription of the fundamental right.151 The Lofton Court rea-
soned that these steps necessarily would have been taken had 
the court recognized a fundamental right.152 Finally, the court 
noted that the Lawrence Court did not explicitly apply strict 
scrutiny to the challenged statute, which would have been re-
quired had a fundamental right had been at stake, and instead 
invalidated the law applying rational basis review.153 
This combination of factors led the Lofton Court to con-
clude that it is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of 
Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental 
right.154 And, it continued, regardless of the type of right an-
nounced, Lawrence would not affect the outcome in Lofton.155 
According to the Lofton court, the Lawrence Court itself 
stressed the narrow factual situation to which the decision ap-
plied, and the facts of Lofton fell outside that realm.156 Unlike 
the situation in Lawrence, this one involved children.157 Thus, 
 
 148. Id. at 817. 
 149. Id. at 816. 
 150. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 72021 (1997)). 
 151. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 817. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. The Lofton court was referring to the following passage in Law-
rence: 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter. 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). This passage was probably not 
intended to foreclose Lawrences application to any situation in which children 
are remotely involved. Rather, it likely served to prevent attempts to use the 
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the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit unanimously af-
firmed the district court and subsequently denied the Lofton 
plaintiffs petition for rehearing en banc.158 The ACLU peti-
tioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to review the deci-
sion;159 however, the Court denied the petition without com-
ment.160 
III.  FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 63.042(3) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND 
CONTRARY TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN 
The Eleventh Circuit erred in upholding section 63.042(3). 
In doing so, it undermined the very principle on which it 
claimed to base its decision: adoption law is guided by the best 
interests of children. Floridas DCF considers the best interests 
of the child on a case-by-case basis in every single adoption.161 
 
decision to claim constitutional protection for sexual conduct less protected 
than the relationship involved in the case, such as child abuse, sexual assault 
upon the disabled, public indecency, and prostitution. The last sentence was 
probably intended to calm those who would read Lawrence as an automatic 
blessing on gay marriagea hotly debated topic on which the Court was not 
yet prepared to choose sidesthough Justice Scalia reads the majority opinion 
as doing just that. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The next passage in the 
opinion states, The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual 
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual 
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. Id. at 
578 (majority opinion). This passage is fully applicable to the facts of Lofton, 
and the Lofton court should have recognized that. 
 158. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 
1275, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), denying rehg en banc to 358 F.3d 804. The court 
denied rehearing without significant comment. Id. Judge Barkett wrote a 
lengthy opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing that 
section 63.042(3) should be held unconstitutional on both due process and 
equal protection grounds. Id. at 12901313 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Two 
judges agreed with Judge Barkett that section 63.042(3) should be invalidated 
under the Equal Protection Clause and dissented for that reason. Id. at 1290 
(Anderson, J., dissenting). Three others dissented on the grounds that the case 
raised important constitutional questions deserving of rehearing en banc. Id. 
at 1313 (Marcus, J., dissenting). 
 159. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lofton, 358 F.3d 804 (No. 04-478). 
 160. Lofton v. Secy, Fla. Dept of Children & Families, 125 S. Ct. 869 
(2005), denying cert. to 358 F.3d 804; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Re-
fuse to Consider Law Banning Gay Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at 
A14; Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), ACLU Disappointed 
the Supreme Court Will Not Hear an Appeal in Case Challenging Floridas 
Anti-Gay Adoption Law, (Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/ 
LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=17292&c=104. 
 161. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.125 (West 2005) (describing the procedure 
for home investigations prior to finalization of any adoption); Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 3 (This individualized evaluation process 
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Upholding Floridas blanket exclusion of gays from the pool of 
adoptive parents makes it impossible to respect the best inter-
ests of children for whom the best outcome is to be adopted by 
their gay foster parents. The Lofton court had an opportunity to 
recognize this fact and to apply settled constitutional doctrine 
to strike down section 63.042(3). But, as discussed below, the 
Lofton court failed to acknowledge the significant import of 
Lawrence v. Texas to the case before it. It misinterpreted and 
underestimated the Lawrence opinion in a manner that could 
set damaging precedent in the Eleventh Circuit and nationally, 
as lower courts continue to grapple with the application of 
Lawrence to substantive due process issues. 
A. FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 63.042(3) IMPERMISSIBLY 
BURDENS THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FORM INTIMATE 
RELATIONSHIPS RECOGNIZED IN LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
Professor Laurence Tribe remarks that when the history 
of our times is written, Lawrence may well be remembered as 
the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian America.162 Lawrence 
was handed down while Lofton was being presented to the 
Eleventh Circuit, which subsequently failed to give Lawrence 
its due consideration. The Eleventh Circuit should have con-
cluded that Lawrence did recognize a fundamental right and 
proceeded to apply strict scrutiny to section 63.042(3). Then, 
the court should have held that section 63.042(3) impermissibly 
burdens both Loftons and Houghtons fundamental right to lib-
erty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and invalidated the law as unconstitutional. 
1. The Supreme Court Announced a Fundamental Right in 
Lawrence v. Texas 
Even a cursory reading of Lawrence reveals that the Su-
preme Court does not relegate gay individuals to second-class 
citizenship. The Court respects gay relationships as central to 
autonomy, as passage after passage in Lawrence demonstrates. 
Lawrence pulled the following language from Casey and applied 
it with equal force to gay relationships: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
 
aims to find adoptive parents who are able to meet the unique needs of each 
child.). 
 162. Tribe, supra note 32, at 1895. 
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autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define ones own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.163 
After making such a statement, the Court would not have 
concluded in the same opinion that intimate acts between gay 
men or lesbians deserve any less stringent constitutional pro-
tection than intimate acts between a man and a woman. And, 
since the privacy cases from Griswold to Casey create a funda-
mental right to private sexual intimacy for straight individuals, 
Lawrence provides the same to gay individuals. As the Court 
stated, Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek auton-
omy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.164 As 
Judge Barkett stated in her dissent from the Eleventh Circuits 
denial of rehearing en banc, The only way to avoid the conclu-
sion that Lawrence recognized a fundamental right . . . is to de-
liberately refuse to give meaning to the overwhelming bulk of 
the words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs used in Law-
rence.165 
The recognition of a fundamental right is implied in the 
Lawrence Courts use of precedent. Griswold was a pertinent 
beginning point,166 and every precedent the court discussed in 
depth involved a fundamental right, until the Court reached 
and discredited Bowers.167 Most involved a fundamental right 
to privacy.168 The Court emphasized the breadth of their hold-
ings as involving private decisions regarding intimate physical 
relationships169 and compared, rather than distinguished, the 
facts of the case before it.170 Its treatment of precedent lends 
itself to the conclusion that the Court intended for Lawrence to 
be next in this line of fundamental rights cases. 
 
 
 163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Par-
enthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
 164. Id.; cf. Wright, supra note 78, at 40809 (urging that, while Lawrence 
may be read to protect private conduct, the decision should be used as a cata-
lyst for mobilizing a demand for public recognition of intimate relationships 
and respect for homosexuality generally). 
 165. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 
1275, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
 167. See id. at 56466. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1305 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 170. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 47. 
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The Court could have reached its result without explicitly 
overruling Bowers. The statute at issue in Bowers was distin-
guishable from the one at issue in Lawrence in that it facially 
applied to both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy.171 The 
Lawrence Court could have used equal protection grounds to 
strike down the Texas law while leaving Bowers intact. The fact 
that the Court chose to apply substantive due process doctrine 
is significant. In reversing its earlier decision and consequently 
invalidating all sodomy laws, the Court arguably remove[d] a 
foundation, indeed some may argue the primary foundation, for 
all laws that place homosexuals at a disadvantage.172 Rather 
than invalidating the law on equal protection grounds, the 
Court chose the doctrine with more punch. It did not want to 
risk a law redrawn to survive on equal protection grounds con-
tinuing to impose the stigma that the Texas law did.173 It 
wanted to ensure that gays would be protected from egregious 
legislation and discrimination in both public and private life, 
which required the recognition of a fundamental due process 
right to engage in the intimate conduct that defines gay indi-
viduals.174 
To conclude that Lawrence applied rational basis review to 
the Texas sodomy law, the Lofton court relied on a single 
phrase and closed its eyes to the rest of the opinion. After the 
Lawrence Court had applied fundamental rights precedent, 
spoken in tones of great respect for the liberty owed to the in-
timate acts in question and forcefully struck down Bowers on 
due process grounds, it mentioned that there could be no le-
gitimate state interest to justify Texass intrusion into the 
lives of the individuals involved.175 The Court never said that it 
was applying rational basis review, and the paragraph sur-
rounding the language in question contains discussion of Casey, 
which involved a fundamental right.176 As Professor Cass Sun-
stein points out, the phrase no legitimate state interest was 
followed by reference to the personal and private life of the in-
dividual, for which the Court had just spent pages proving it 
 
 171. See Tribe, supra note 32, at 190708. 
 172. Martin R. Gardner, Adoption by Homosexuals in the Wake of Law-
rence v. Texas, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 19, 20 (2004). 
 173. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. at 578. 
 176. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 47. 
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had the utmost respect.177 Thus, the statement containing the 
words legitimate state interest can and should be interpreted 
to mean that the liberty interest involved is so worthy of pro-
tection that the law burdening it could not even be upheld on 
rational basis review because the intrusion was too great.178 
Lawrence does not refer expressly to the fundamental 
right it is protecting or the strict scrutiny it is applying in 
striking down Texass sodomy law. The Lofton court used this 
absence to support the interpretation that the Court was apply-
ing rational basis review.179 But the fundamental nature of the 
right, though not characterized as such expressly, is evident in 
several passages of Lawrence.180 For example, the Court stated 
that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause 
has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in de-
fining the rights of the person.181 The Lofton court also erred 
in insinuating that a right not proven to be deeply rooted in 
history and tradition could not be fundamental under Glucks-
berg.182 Again, the court ignored Lawrences words, which de-
scribe a movement away from such a rigid requirement, direct-
ing that [h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not 
in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process in-
quiry.183 
Perhaps the advocates of a libertarian approach are cor-
rect, and Lawrence signaled a retreat from traditional substan-
tive due process analysis in favor of a scheme that recognizes 
liberty interests and engages in an interactive, dynamic, and 
even political analysis.184 Under this approach, section 
63.042(3) would still be invalidated, for, as the law applies in 
the Lofton case, it infringes upon a liberty interest of the plain-
tiffs without demonstrating infringement of the rights of oth-
ers. John Does rights are arguably infringed more while the 
law is upheld than they would be if he were allowed to be  
 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id.; Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1151. 
 179. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
81617 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
 180. See Tribe, supra note 32, at 191617. 
 181. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. 
 182. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816.  
 183. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 184. See Recent Case, supra note 127, at 2796. 
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adopted by his father and remain in his home. However, it is 
doubtful that the Supreme Court purported to adopt a sliding 
scale of analysis without saying so,185 and lower courts should 
be hesitant to assume that it has done so without express word 
from the Court.186 
It is more likely that the Court purported to acknowledge a 
fundamental right in line with those recognized in the Gris-
wold-Eisenstadt-Roe line of cases, as discussed above. The rec-
ognition of a fundamental right requires application of strict 
scrutiny to section 63.042(3), which burdens that right. In order 
to be upheld, the law must be narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of a compelling state interest. 
2. Section 63.042(3) Burdens a Fundamental Right and Is Not 
Narrowly Tailored to Achieving a Compelling State Interest 
Section 63.042(3) burdens the fundamental right to privacy 
described in Lawrence, which includes the right of two adults to 
engage in private, noncommercial, sexual intimacy. It forces 
gay individuals to choose between their sexuality and being 
considered as an adoptive parent. The law, then, can only with-
stand fundamental rights analysis if it is narrowly tailored to 
the achievement of a compelling state interest. Rarely do laws 
withstand strict scrutiny, and section 63.042(3) is no exception. 
The primary interest asserted by the State in Lofton is to 
further the best interests of adoptive children by placing them 
in homes with a married mother and father.187 Serving the best 
interests of adoptive children is unquestionably compelling, but 
it is debatable whether exclusively placing children in homes 
with a married mother and father always furthers that inter-
est. It would be difficult to argue that remaining with Steven 
Lofton, the only father he has known in his thirteen years, is 
not in John Does best interest.188 Doe has committed parents, 
siblings, and a home in which his friends are welcome and he is 
loved.189 The DCF has recognized this fact, and even the Lofton  
 
 
 185. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 48. 
 186. See Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1152 (A Court about to embark on a 
new and highly controversial adventure into judicially mandated laissez-faire 
economics would at least drop a hint.). 
 187. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. 
 188. See Mark Strasser, Adoption and the Best Interests of the Child: On 
the Use and Abuse of Studies, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 629, 63435 (2004). 
 189. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 10. 
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court recognized that Loftons efforts in caring for [his] chil-
dren have been exemplary.190 
Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the interest 
asserted by the State is compelling, the means employed by the 
State must still be narrowly tailored to that interest for the law 
to be upheld under strict scrutiny.191 In this case, the law is not 
narrowly tailored to the interest asserted. There are more chil-
dren in foster care in Florida than there are married couples 
wishing to adopt,192 and taking gays out of the equation does 
not create additional married couplesit only increases the 
disparity. Moreover, section 63.042(3) is underinclusive, as the 
State allows single, straight parents to adopt,193 which does not 
further the States asserted goal of placing them with married 
parents. No other class of people is categorically excluded by 
the law, including disabled people, people who have had chil-
dren removed from their care, substance abusers, and those 
with a history of domestic violence.194 Section 63.042(3) is also 
overinclusive, as it excludes adoption by gay couples in stable, 
marriage-like relationships, which will, in many cases, better 
serve the best interests of an adopted child. Both under- and 
overinclusive, section 63.042(3) is not narrowly tailored toward 
achieving the States asserted interest. Thus, section 63.042(3) 
cannot survive the strict scrutiny required for laws burdening a 
fundamental right, which renders it unconstitutional under 
Lawrence. 
 
 190. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807. 
 191. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
427 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
 192. See Appellants Brief, supra note 103, at 29 ([D]espite all the re-
cruitment and all the adoptions by single parents that result, there remain 
over three thousand children eligible for adoption with no placements at all.); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 7 (stating that when the 
Lofton case was dismissed by the district court there were over 3,400 children 
in Florida . . . for whom there were no adoptive parents available); ACLU 
LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 9 ([Florida] does every-
thing it can to get married couples to adopt, and still falls far short of the 
number of parents it needs.). 
 193. See ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 11 
(stating that twenty-five percent of Florida children adopted out of foster care 
are placed with single parents). 
 194. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 45. These individu-
als are given an opportunity to apply to be adoptive parents, though they may 
be denied through a screening process if the State deems them incapable of 
meeting a childs needs. Id. at 56. 
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B. EVEN IF LAWRENCE DID NOT ANNOUNCE A FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT, SECTION 63.042(3) CANNOT STAND UNDER RATIONAL 
BASIS REVIEW 
The State of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit got one point 
right: adoption law is guided by the best interests of the child. 
Floridas primary asserted interest was in furthering the best 
interests of adopted children by placing them in homes with 
married mothers and fathers.195 It also asserted an interest in 
promoting public morality.196 Even if, as the Lofton court found, 
Lawrence did not involve a fundamental right that would sub-
ject section 63.042(3) to strict scrutiny, the law must still be ra-
tionally related to achieving a legitimate state interest. Ra-
tional basis review is certainly a deferential standard, but it is 
not completely toothless.197 The Supreme Court has invalidated 
statutes applying rational basis review.198 Because section 
63.042(3) is not rationally related to achieving the States first 
interest, and the second is not a legitimate interest, the law 
should not stand even under a rational basis review. 
1. Section 63.042(3) Is Not Rationally Related to Furthering 
the Best Interests of Adoptive Children 
There are thousands of children in Florida awaiting adop-
tion into permanent homes.199 While the State seeks homes 
with married parents, these children languish in foster care. 
Many will age-out of the system after living in several foster 
homes without ever having been adopted. It is not rational to 
 
 195. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. 
 196. Id. at 819 n.17. 
 197. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (citing Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)). 
 198. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 
(1985) (finding no rational basis for requiring a special-use permit for a home 
for mentally handicapped adults and noting that the requirement appeared to 
be based on an irrational prejudice against the mentally disabled); Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (striking down a dividend distribution plan 
because the State had shown no interest rationally advanced by its distinction 
between citizens who had become residents prior to 1959 and all other citi-
zens); U.S. Dept of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529, 538 (1973) (striking 
down a provision of the Federal Food Stamp Act limiting eligibility for the food 
stamp program to households in which all individuals were related to one an-
other, because the provision had no rational basis). 
 199. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 823 (estimating that there are 3,000 children in 
foster care in Florida); Scott D. Ryan et al., Floridas Gay Adoption Ban: What 
Do Floridians Think?, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY 261, 262 (2004) (estimat-
ing that there are 5,000 children in need of homes in Florida). 
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think that excluding gays from adoption will somehow increase 
the number of married couples desiring to adopt. Excluding 
gays from adopting simply cannot advance the States asserted 
interest in placing children with married parents.200 Rather, it 
keeps children from being adopted by gay couples in committed 
relationships who would serve their best interests much more 
than would remaining in foster care. Adoption by gay parents is 
more rationally related to the presumed purpose of Floridas 
asserted interest in finding married homes for its children, 
which is finding stable, loving homes for those children. This is 
especially true for older children who are less likely to be 
adopted at all.201 The State knows of no child who has been 
placed in foster care because of any harm associated with hav-
ing gay parents.202 However, the State has extensive experience 
with the behavior of substance abusers and child abusers re-
sulting in their children being placed in foster care, yet it does 
not categorically exclude these individuals from applying to 
adopt.203 
In Lofton, the State of Florida showed concern for the ef-
fects of gay parenting on the development of a childs sexual 
and gender identity and socialization.204 Several studies 
have investigated the effects of a gay parent on child develop-
ment and parent-child relationships. Sociologists Judith Stacey 
and Timothy Biblarz compiled and summarized the findings of 
twenty-one of them. Overwhelmingly, the data indicates that 
being raised by a gay parent has no detrimental effect on chil-
dren.205 Gay parents are as devoted to their children as straight 
 
 200. Some opponents of gay marriage argue that gay individuals do have 
the right to marry, as long as they marry a person of the opposite sex. See 
Strasser, supra note 188, at 636. It follows from this argument that since gay 
people can marry legally, they can further the States interest in placing chil-
dren with married parents, just as heterosexual singles can. See id. While it is 
true that gay people are less likely to enter into legally recognized marriages, 
Florida does not inquire into the likelihood that adoption applicants will 
marry. See id. at 637. 
 201. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and 
Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 
668 (1999). 
 202. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 6. 
 203. See id. at 56. 
 204. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. 
 205. See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orien-
tation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 160 (2001); see also Motion of 
the Child Welfare League of America for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners and Brief Amicus Curiae at 1617, Lofton v. Secy, Fla. 
Dept of Children & Families, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005) (No. 04-478) [hereinafter 
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parents.206 They perform as well on every measure of parent-
ing skills.207 Children of gay parents are emotionally, behav-
iorally, developmentally, and cognitively similar to children of 
straight parents.208 Though having gay parents may increase 
the likelihood that a child would be more open to considering a 
gay relationship, studies conclude that it does not increase the 
likelihood that the child will self-identify as gay.209 
The few perceived differences that exist between children 
of gay parents and children of straight parents are not neces-
sarily negative.210 For example, research reveals that daugh-
ters of lesbians are more likely to consider nontraditional gen-
der occupations, such as being an astronaut or a doctor.211 A 
compilation of studies on children of lesbian mothers found that 
children of lesbians had slightly better mental health than 
other children.212 Lesbian mothers also fared better than di-
vorced fathers and stepfathers at maintaining healthy and 
open relationships with their children.213 Not one reliable study 
has identified any negative risk to children caused by gay par-
enting.214 
Reputed child advocacy groups, including the Child Wel-
fare League of America, the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psy-
chological Association, have made statements in support of al- 
 
 
Amicus Brief of the CWLA]. But see Lynn D. Wardle, Considering the Impacts 
of Children and Society of Lesbigay Parenting, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 541, 
543 (2004) (asserting that children are most benefited and most protected 
when they are raised by their mother and father who are married to each 
other[,] so [l]ogically, it is not unreasonable to expect that lesbigay parenting 
will not prove to be as beneficial for children or for society). 
 206. See Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 1520. 
 207. Id. at 16. 
 208. See id. at 1617. 
 209. See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 205, at 17071. 
 210. See Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 1519; see also, e.g., 
Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 205, at 16870. 
 211. See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 205, at 168. 
 212. See, e.g., id. at 17172 n.11. 
 213. See id. at 175. 
 214. It should be noted that few, if any, of the existing studies on gay par-
enting were conducted using ideal scientific methods. Stacey and Biblarz ar-
gue that hetero-normative convictions lead to biased research. Id. at 162. Also, 
categorizing gay subjects is complex, and sample sizes are small, nonran-
dom, and unrepresentative. See id. at 16466; see also Wardle, supra note 205, 
at 55056. 
BACKER_3FMT 01/23/2006 05:03:31 PM 
2006] GIVING LAWRENCE ITS DUE 775 
 
lowing gay adoption.215 Floridas own policies regarding foster 
care indicate that DCF officials agree with the research and 
professional opinion. The State places children with gay foster 
parents and legal guardians,216 which are arrangements that 
should also be made in the best interest of the child.217 When 
Steven Lofton relocated to Oregon in 1998, the DCF gave him 
permission to relocate Doe, agreeing that it was in Does mani-
fest best interest to stay with Lofton.218 When Floridas lead-
ing official overseeing adoption policy was deposed prior to the 
Lofton case, she was asked, Do you know of any child-welfare 
reason at all for excluding gay people from adopting chil-
dren?219 She answered, No.220 Social science research demon-
strates and the DCFs actions indicate that its officials agree 
that gay individuals are just as capable of being outstanding 
parents as heterosexuals. Thus, Floridas blanket exclusion is 
not rationally related to the States interest in furthering the 
best interests of children. 
Florida has expressed through legislation that its goal for 
all of its foster children is adoption.221 It is well established 
that children who are adopted out of foster care are more suc-
cessful than children who remain in foster care until major-
ity.222 The story of Steven Lofton and John Doe is a case in 
point that adoption by gay parents is decidedly better than re-
maining in foster care, at least for some children.223 Also, sec-
tion 63.042(3) prevents the adoption of children by a gay or les- 
 
 
 215. See Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 1115; ACLU LES-
BIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 2530. 
 216. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 6. 
 217. Laura A. Turbe, Comment, Floridas Inconsistent Use of the Best In-
terests of the Child Standard, 33 STETSON L. REV. 369, 382 (2003) (quoting 
FLA. STAT. § 39.45(2) (2002)). 
 218. Affidavit of Steven K. Lofton, supra note 101, ¶ 19. 
 219. ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 11 (quot-
ing from the deposition of Carol Hutchinson). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022(1)(a), (c) (West 2005) (The [S]tate has a 
compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive 
children, and [a]doptive children have the right to permanence and stability 
in adoptive placements.). 
 222. See Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 34; see also Gard-
ner, supra note 172, at 26. 
 223. Cf. Strasser, supra note 188, at 635 (It is difficult to understand how 
a law that dictates th[e] result [in Lofton] could be construed as promoting the 
best interests of children.). 
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bian relative, a person with whom the child is usually familiar, 
which lessens the trauma of a new caregiver.224 A relative 
would also be more likely to encourage the child to maintain re-
lationships with other family members.225 Placement with a 
gay relative would likely be in the best interest of some adop-
tive children, but section 63.042(3) precludes the possibility. 
In every potential adoption, the DCF screens adoption ap-
plicants and employs additional policies and procedures to en-
sure that a placement is in the childs best interests.226 Thus, if 
the purpose of section 63.042(3) truly is to strive for placements 
in the best interests of children, it is redundant and unneces-
sary. If there are legitimate reasons for denying some gays 
permission to adopt, which will be the same reasons for deny-
ing certain people generally permission to adopt, those indi-
viduals will be eliminated through the standard screening 
process. The fact that a law is unnecessary does not make it ir-
rational, but section 63.042(3), by categorically excluding gay 
adoption applicants, prevents courts from making case-by-case 
determinations, which, in the Lofton case particularly, would 
be in the best interests of the child.227 As Mark Strasser argues: 
The point . . . is not that it is bad for children to be raised by a father 
and mother but merely that many kinds of parents can provide homes 
in which children may thrive and we should not pretend otherwise. To 
do so does a disservice both to society and to the children them-
selves.228 
Section 63.042(3) is not rationally related to furthering the 
best interests of every child, as the Lofton case aptly demon-
strates. Therefore, it cannot be upheld even under rational ba-
sis review. 
 
 
 224. Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 7. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Cf. § 63.125 (describing the procedure for home investigations prior to 
finalization of any adoption); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 
3 (This individualized evaluation process aims to find adoptive parents who 
are able to meet the unique needs of each child.). 
 227. But see Erica Gesing, Note, The Fight to be a Parent: How Courts Have 
Restricted the Constitutionally-Based Challenges Available to Homosexuals, 38 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 841, 84950 (2004) (pointing out that even if bans on gay 
and lesbian adoption were lifted, the best interests of the child standard would 
allow for substantial flexibility on the part of judges, and many homosexuals 
still might be precluded from adoption if a judge were unwilling to accept the 
concept of the evolving definition of family). 
 228. Strasser, supra note 188, at 641. 
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2. Promoting Public Morality Is Not a Legitimate State 
Interest 
Though the Lofton court glossed over it, Florida asserted 
an interest in furthering public morality with section 
63.042(3).229 This can only mean that the State considers being 
gay immoral. As Romer makes clear, advancing the moral be-
liefs of a majority and expressing disapproval of a class of peo-
ple cannot be a legitimate interest.230 The Lofton court cited 
two Supreme Court cases to support its unnecessary conclu-
sion that morality is a legitimate state interest, both decided 
prior to Romer and Lawrence and no longer good law.231 Flor-
idas interest in furthering public morality cannot be a legiti-
mate state interest on which to base its adoption law. 
Not only should the Lofton court have held that this as-
serted state interest was not legitimate, it should have recog-
nized that, as the State impliedly admits and is clear from the 
legislative history, the purpose of enacting and continually en-
forcing section 63.042(3) was to express moral disapproval of 
gays.232 It is irrational to uphold a law that categorically ex-
cludes a class of people on the grounds that it serves the best 
interests of children, when an alternative exists that refrains 
from discriminating against a class of people and leaves chil-
dren equally well-off. The only possible reason for Florida to re-
tain the law is that the States purpose is to express disap-
proval of gays. In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a 
state constitutional amendment because its means were so ir-
rationally related to its ends that a motivation of animus was 
implied.233 Section 63.042(3) involves an even clearer history of 
animus than did Amendment 2 in Romer.234 Moreover, 
 
 229. Lofton v. Secy of the Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
819 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); see also supra 
note 141 (discussing Floridas asserted interest in promoting public morality 
and the Eleventh Circuits response). 
 230. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
 231. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819 n.17 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 
U.S. 560, 569 (1991), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)). 
 232. See ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 78 
(discussing the antigay bases behind the passage of section 63.042(3)); id. at 
11 (noting that a DCF representative could advance not one child-welfare-
related reason why gays should be excluded from adoption); see also Affidavit 
of Steven K. Lofton, supra note 101, ¶ 19 (discussing the DCFs acknowledg-
ment that remaining with Lofton was in Does best interest). 
 233. 517 U.S. at 63435; see also supra note 71. 
 234. See supra note 71 (discussing the animus involved in Colorados 
Amendment 2). 
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Amendment 2 revoked protection against discrimination 
against gays primarily in economic contexts, while Section 
63.042(3) deals with a part of human life even more central to 
personhood, adoption of and caring for a child.235 
Despite the fact that Romer was based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and applied rational basis review while Law-
rence was grounded in the Due Process Clause, Lawrence dis-
cussed Romer as instructive precedent of principal 
relevance.236 The Lawrence Court then went on to praise Jus-
tice Stevenss Bowers dissent, which asserted that advancing 
the moral code of the majority was not a sufficient justification 
for upholding a law.237 It invoked Romer and the Bowers dis-
sent to further illustrate the mistake of Bowers and likely to 
ensure protection for gay individuals from future infringement 
on rights not deemed fundamental. Thus, the directive in Ro-
mer is arguably mandatory for rational basis review in a due 
process analysis as well as in an equal protection analysis.238 
Section 63.042(3) is so irrationally related to achieving the 
States legitimate interest in placing children with married 
parents that animus should be inferred. Also, the States as-
serted interest in public morality, as well as the legislative his-
tory of the law, indicates that it was enacted out of animus to-
ward gays. Such motivations are impermissible grounds for 
legislation, and section 63.042(3) should be struck down under 
Lawrence and Romer, even on rational basis review. 
CONCLUSION 
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family 
Services constituted a costly error by the Eleventh Circuit. Not 
only will the decision potentially remove a boy from his father, 
his siblings, and the only home he has ever known, it also takes 
a step back from the progress made in Lawrence toward be-
stowing upon gay relationships the recognition and security 
they deserve. Forcing Steven Lofton to choose between his 
 
 235. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 145, at 212. 
 236.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 237. See id. at 57778 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 238. See Andrew Koppelman, Lawrences Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1171, 1180 (2004) (arguing that the one clear rule that emerges from Lawrence 
is that if a State singles out gays for harsh treatment or encourages prejudice 
against them, the Court will presume a bare desire to harm gays, rather than 
mere moral disapproval). 
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partner of over twenty years and adopting his son impermissi-
bly burdens his constitutional right to libertyhis right to in-
timate relationships on which the State should be forbidden 
from trampling. 
The Supreme Court handed down a puzzle with Lawrence, 
but lower courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit, should arrange the pieces into a picture of liberty, 
not of tolerance for irrational discrimination. The Lawrence 
Courts deliberate use of language, precedent, and stringent 
substantive due process doctrine indicate that the Court recog-
nized a fundamental right to form intimate relationships, a 
right that had long been extended to heterosexuals and was 
overdue to be extended to gays. Florida Statute section 
63.042(3) impermissibly burdens the gay Lofton plaintiffs fun-
damental rights, and Lawrence required that strict scrutiny be 
applied. As the law is not narrowly tailored to achieving a com-
pelling state interest, section 63.042(3) cannot stand, and the 
Lofton court should have struck it down. Alternatively, even if 
Lawrence did not recognize a fundamental right, section 
63.042(3) is not rationally related to achieving a legitimate 
state interest in furthering the best interests of children, and 
promoting public morality is not a legitimate state interest un-
der Lawrence. Thus, section 63.042(3) cannot stand even on ra-
tional basis review. The Lofton court evaded Lawrence, but the 
next court to consider the law ought not to repeat that mistake. 
A law that impermissibly burdens the fundamental rights of 
gays and undermines the best interests of children like John 
Doe should not remain on Floridas books. 
